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In thIs paper, I wish to discuss an ‘ethics of  care’ that was adopted by spectators and artists in a sup-
port network established for women theatre practitioners in Brisbane. My paper is structured around 
three theoretical positions suggested by the conference title ‘BEFORE, DURING, and AFTER.’ I 
begin with a brief  view of  the support network in Brisbane called Magdalena Talks Back (M.T.B.), a 
network that has been meeting regularly since the Magdalena Australia Festival in 2003. Because the 
activities being discussed happened BEFORE this session, I consciously employ a retrospective view 
to describe observable conditions and ideas that led to the group devising and implementing an ethi-
cal framework based on ‘care’. The next section continues to examine past events, but I switch from 
the position of  a spectator documenting a practice performed by others and consider some ethical 
questions I was exploring DURING feedback sessions. From this position, I explain why I wanted to 
exercise a form of  deliberation called practical reasoning and why some philosophers distinguish this 
approach as an important mode of  enquiry. While these two positions acknowledge the distance be-
tween you and the practice I studied, the third section of  this paper assumes quite a different position 
by recognising that I am speaking to you now, AFTER my involvement in M.T.B. sessions. From this 
position, I will invite you to consider whether or not practical reasoning can and should be exercised 
while deliberating over ideas discussed in this public forum. In order to initiate this form of  reason-
ing, I will outline a few ideas forwarded by the philosopher Martha Nussbaum and the pragmatic 
sociologist Luc Boltanski and then ask for volunteers to explore how these arguments might inform 
the practice we are developing here today. And despite the epic structure these positions suggest, I 
promise this process will only take a short time.
PART 1
BEFORE: A brief  history of  Magdalena Talks Back
In this first section I want to emphasise my position as an observer of  events so I have decided to use a 
question and answer format to relay data about various features, aims, and people in the Magdalena 
Talks Back network. While I acknowledge that the data being outlined is selective, I hope the format 
will invite you to consider whether or not the information being delivered offers an objective view of  
the events.
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a) What is the history of  the M.T.B. network?
The M.T.B. network was established in response to needs and concerns outlined by participants at 
an international women’s theatre festival produced in Brisbane in 2003 called Magdalena Austra-
lia 2003. This festival was instigated and organised by three Brisbane theatre practitioners Dawn 
Albinger, Julie Robson and Scotia Monkivitch who secured funding and sponsorship from a range of  
sources and attracted support from many other women theatre practitioners and theatre scholars. The 
festival in Brisbane was organised and promoted nationally and internationally as an event that would 
enable women involved in the creation and study of  independent theatre in and around Australia to 
gather together to share and develop the ideas and practices of  women working in and across local, 
interstate and global theatre networks. The festival organisers also aimed to introduce and link Aus-
tralian women theatre practitioners to the opportunities and activities associated with an international 
support network called ‘The Magdalena Project’.
b) What is the Magdelena Project?
The Magdalena Project is an international network of  women artists that began in the late 1970s 
and early 80s when a number of  women developing experimental theatre work in the U.K. and 
Europe started exploring representations of  women in theatre practices. Jill Greenhalgh was one of  
those artists and an active member of  the Cardiff  Laboratory Theatre. She is also recognised as the 
founder of  the Magdalena Project because it was she who instigated the first international festival 
of  women’s theatre in Cardiff, Wales in 1986 called Madgalena ‘86. That festival was a three week 
long event with a range of  workshops, debates and performances and it laid the foundations for the 
formation of  a network of  women theatre practitioners that has continued to support, challenge 
and encourage women producing theatre in a range of  countries around the world. While many 
different women (and men) have been involved in the many and varied activities associated with the 
network since the first festival (and differences are respected), a number of  aims were written down 
by core members of  the Magdalena Project in 1989 that Chris Fry argues have “remained intact” 
(2007, 14). These aims are outlined below and now posted on the Magdalena Project’s webpage (see 
list of  works cited). They also provide clear directions and foundational values for artists and those 
producing events affiliated with the Magdalena Project, including the Festival in Brisbane in 2003.
The aims of  the Madgalena Project are:
• To increase the awareness of  women’s contribution to contemporary theatre.
• To enable women to explore new approaches to theatre making that more profoundly  
   reflect their own experience.
• To create the fora that can give voice to the concerns of  women working in theatre.
• To encourage women to examine their role in the future of  theatre and to question 
   existing structures.
The Project seeks to achieve these aims:
• By providing opportunities for women to work together to create productions and     
   performances.
• By providing opportunities for women to share and develop and pass on their work     
   through pedagogical activities, workshops, collaborations and conferences.
• By adopting a rational approach to documentation and disseminating information.
• By maintaining the flexibility of  an organic structure which will serve the expansion of        
   the growing network.
If  there is an overall objective it is to create the artistic and economic structures to enable women to
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work (http://www.themagdalenaproject.org/project/aims.htm).
c) How did the M.T.B. sessions grow out of  the Brisbane Festival?
During one of  the public forums organized at the Magdalena Australia Festival in Brisbane in 2003, 
Jill Greenhalgh (who is both greatly respected as the founder of  The Magdalena Project, and a little 
feared due to her often fierce defence of  her beliefs), said she believed artists in the Australian network 
needed to make their work ‘better’ if  they wanted to produce ‘good’ work. I could see a number of  
Australian artists physically grimace and bristle at this suggestion and some later told me they believed 
it was problematic to apply such general and loaded evaluative terms to diverse practices. However, 
the main organizers of  the festival in Australia (Monkovitch, Robson and Albinger) thought it was im-
portant to establish a support network to continue talking about such ideas and to offer support for lo-
cal artists developing new work. As a result, they founded M.T.B. to provide an ongoing forum to dis-
cuss ideas and practices from the festival and to offer women from the local branch of  the Magdalena 
network further opportunities to share works in progress, compare evaluative strategies and processes, 
and obtain feedback on specific productions from others supporting similar ideals.
d) How do sessions feed back to artists?
Various activities, discussions, and feedback processes with different artists have characterised M.T.B. 
sessions because they have evolved according to the interests and practices being explored by par-
ticipants and members of  the network. ‘Feedback’ sessions can therefore include: reports by artists 
on working methods or processes of  production; group discussions of  selected topics or methods 
of  analysis being developed; demonstrations of  work; rehearsed readings of  drafts of  plays; shared 
analyses of  productions members have agreed to attend; and more conventional types of  feedback 
sessions with playwrights, directors, visual artists and/or performers.
e) Are feedback sessions documented?
In addition to sessions where attending members of  M.T.B. are invited to give immediate feedback on 
work that has been presented for analysis by the group, written reports on feedback models for specific 
practitioners have also been produced. Written reports have included summaries of  comments, criti-
cisms, points of  discussion and new ideas or directions that have been suggested by members who 
have offered feedback. However, M.T.B. members have collectively agreed that such details cannot be 
circulated within the group (or published elsewhere) without permission from the artist/s that give and 
receive the feedback. A number of  artists within the M.T.B. network have allowed reports of  feedback 
sessions to be circulated throughout the e-group for further discussion. However, most artists receiving 
feedback are hesitant about permitting wider circulation of  such material as reports usually expose 
sensitive or raw areas analysed and evaluated during sessions that may not be appropriate for others 
evaluating a finished product. Not surprisingly, some artists have chosen not to have details about their 
professional decisions or areas for development circulated for scrutiny by others outside each session.
I should therefore also acknowledge that those preparing reports that are not circulated can find the 
lack of  transparency frustrating since time and effort goes into the documentation of  sessions and 
models. Nevertheless, a primary and immediate focus on caring for the particular artist/s receiving 
feedback continues to supersede any general or scholarly interest that might be stimulated by dissemi-
nating material contained in written reports. A focus on caring for those producing theatrical works 
has therefore remained a basic principle of  this network, even when feedback has been organised 
for artists outside the network. For example, M.T.B. offered a feedback session in conjunction with 
the University of  Queensland’s Drama Reading Group for a production of  Shakespeare’s Comedy of  
Errors mounted by the Queensland Shakespeare Ensemble (Q.S.E.). Although debate over the repre-
sentation of  women in the company’s gender ‘blind’ casting was a part of  this session very relevant to
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ongoing M.T.B. discussions, permission was not granted to circulate reports of  the feedback model 
developed for the Q.S.E.’s production and that decision made by the Company’s director continues 
to be respected.
e) Have artists receiving feedback found M.T.B. methods useful?
Yes and no. Methods of  planning and delivering feedback have been evolving since the network was 
first established and some approaches have been deemed more useful than others. I would argue that 
the models now being implemented are better able to respond to the needs of  a range of  artists since 
they have been developed in response to a number of  previous challenges. Less fruitful responses 
were evident in the very first traditional feedback session when three local artists asked to receive 
feedback on a production in which they had collaborated. Two of  these artists were very experienced 
and comfortable with collecting feedback so they asked to direct the feedback session and negotiated 
the different responses they encountered. During the session they asked specific questions and, since 
they primarily directed the session, the facilitator appointed from M.T.B. played little part in the pro-
ceedings except to introduce the artists, invite questions and then later echo the gratitude expressed 
by the artists receiving feedback. However, in a later discussion sometime after the session, the two 
experienced artists were asked to comment on the quality of  the feedback session and both said they 
were sometimes a little unsure of  what was being expressed by others and that some comments were 
more useful and relevant than others [see next section below for further details]. As a result of  their 
feedback on the session, M.T.B. members decided that the appointment of  a gatekeeper would be 
useful in self-directed sessions who could be informed of  artists’ interests and called on to intervene if  
the responses of  those giving feedback strayed off  topic or lost focus.
Alternatively, in a later feedback session organised for an artist who requested feedback on work she 
had recently devised and performed, the artist realised on the day the feedback session was scheduled 
that she was still too emotionally involved in the work and not ready to consider critical responses. As 
a result, she decided not to attend the feedback session and the facilitator of  her session asked partici-
pants to write down responses that could be opened and read when the artist in question was ready 
to consider the views of  others. Discussion of  the work was invited from participants in the session 
after they had written their responses but it remained unclear when or if  the written responses would 
ever be opened by the artist or if  observations made during the discussion would be passed on by the 
facilitator to the artist. As a result of  further evaluation of  this process, a number of  issues were raised 
about the benefits of  feedback for members involved in giving as well as receiving feedback which 
have subsequently been addressed within later feedback models.
f) Do the sessions prompt further ethical questions?
Ethical questions about the discursive practices being employed by members in feedback sessions were 
raised in M.T.B. from the very first feedback session when responses indicated that members of  the 
network had diverse interests and values that required further consideration. For example, when par-
ticipants were asked to offer their feedback on the particular work being discussed in the first session, 
a few spectators responded by outlining their beliefs about what theatre and performance ‘should’ be 
rather than tailoring their responses to reply to the questions and interests being outlined by those that 
had produced the work being discussed. Alternatively, some spectators identified their own aesthetic 
preferences and/or the ethical and political values they supported and used to inform their readings 
of  the work in question but then clearly offered comments on aspects of  the production or process they 
thought could be explored or developed further. There were also some respondents that preferred to 
reinforce or affirm aspects of  work they had enjoyed or admired rather than isolating weaknesses and 
still others that said after the meeting that they did not contribute because they thought that they did
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not have any useful comments to add. As a result, this session alerted the founding members of  M.T.B. 
to the fact that some artist-spectators may not be willing to consider, discuss, or utilise evaluative 
frames, theatrical styles, or feedback models they did not employ (or value). In such cases, it has been 
recognised that participants in sessions may also need to be offered more opportunities to explore 
their own experiences, methods, and values in sessions dedicated to supporting the development of  
their own and other processes.
g) How did an ‘Ethics of  Care’ develop in sessions?
Despite the tensions and silences different views and approaches have sometimes generated in M.T.B. 
sessions, group members have been encouraged to regard the responses of  all participants in feedback 
sessions as valid and valuable processes for each individual. However, various sessions have also raised 
questions about the general value of  feedback processes for artists. A few members have expressed doubts 
and questions about whether M.T.B. feedback can effectively and practically implement the group’s 
initial aim of  offering support for the development of  work. Some members have questioned whether 
feedback is actually inhibitive to creative processes and some have wondered when or if  artists can ever 
really know if  they are able to give and receive feedback without challenging or damaging non-rational 
responses or creative impulses they value. Discussions such as these have continued to raise further ques-
tions and arguments about what is useful, valuable and valued in feedback sessions, the wider community, 
and during the development of  new work. As this kind of  discussion is now an intrinsic part of  M.T.B. 
sessions, much consideration has been given to determining the different values supported by various 
practitioners and spectators and when, how and if  feedback can be effectively and ethically conveyed.
A clear result of  these deliberations was that regular members of  the group also decided to experi-
ment with implementing what they called an ‘ethics of  care’ when offering feedback to artists. Essen-
tially, this ethical framework grew out of  an understanding that a caring ‘ethos’ or attitude could be 
adopted by individuals wishing to discuss the values and interests of  others producing work. Instead 
of  imposing a rigid structure or rules, the ethical framework introduced in M.T.B. would suggest the 
adoption of  an ethos of  ‘care’ by inviting other artists to consider needs and interests identified by the 
person/s receiving and giving feedback. Those facilitating sessions therefore began reminding specta-
tor/participants that the subject/s receiving feedback had outlined needs and aims intended to be the 
main focus of  the deliberation while also reminding artists that divergent values may still be articu-
lated by spectators. In order to be properly prepared to mediate and conduct a variety of  responses, 
a facilitator of  a feedback session is expected to identify the needs of  the artist/s asking for feedback. 
They are therefore appointed before the session so that they can arrange to meet and interview the 
artist/s in order to determine what kind of  feedback may be counter-productive or productive for 
each project/person. During these meetings, facilitators can ask whether those receiving feedback 
wish to utilise some kind of  method, filter, facilitator, or mediation process they believe may produce 
potentially useful responses or would prefer to direct discussions themselves.
The aims developed for each session can differ dramatically according to the interests and involve-
ment of  those receiving feedback. Artists can decide to be present or absent when feedback is offered. 
Some have expressed a desire to receive general feedback on specific aspects of  plays being written or 
performances being developed. Other artists have invited general responses to various written or per-
formed texts while still others have expressed an interest in receiving feedback from a specific person 
within the network with a special expertise or relevant skills, knowledge or experience. While feedback 
models have differed, those seeking feedback have often noted during pre-session or after-session 
interviews how much they appreciate the opportunity to discuss their work with fellow practitioners.
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However, some artists have been unclear about the kinds of  responses they were willing and able to 
consider so facilitators have also had to list and discuss a range of  options available to help develop a 
session plan for the artist/s that ensures their specific needs and interests are identified.
While no formal interview system for facilitators has been developed to date, the initial interview pro-
cess has consistently produced aims to explore during sessions. Facilitators are central to this process as 
they are expected to determine what elements are needed to produce the best results for those receiv-
ing and giving feedback and to outline the structure artists wish to explore with the group. They are 
then expected to monitor and invite responses within the session before asking for further comments 
prior to closing the session. Within all these stages, the facilitator is now also expected to implement 
an ethics of  care for all participants during sessions and to find ways to help respondents care about 
connecting with the queries or interests outlined by the artist in question before the session.
f) Have the M.T.B. ethos and feedback models been successful & do they offer anything 
new or useful?
While this process has been gradually developed and adapted during M.T.B. sessions, many of  you 
will probably also recognise similarities with other feedback methods used by dramaturges in theatre 
companies or organisations such as the National Playwrights’ Association. M.T.B. is a little different 
in that it has consciously left room for the identification of  contributors’ interests in feedback sessions 
as individuals that are part of  a community developing different abilities and values. In this sense, I 
believe a broad aim of  the Magdalena Project has been achieved by this group in that M.T.B. sessions 
have developed a network [albeit small] and a method that members believe ethically supports the 
development of  diverse aesthetic, ethical, and political aims within a community with particular ar-
tistic and social aims. As the group has not attracted enthusiastic support from more artists, the future 
of  the network looks a little bleak until more artists become involved. Nevertheless, if  the network 
is sustained, I believe members may further enhance their chances of  enjoying success if  they keep 
exercising a form of  practical reasoning that explores what individuals in specific communities regard 
as good.
PART 2
DURING: Develop the ‘virtue’ of  practical wisdom through practical reasoning
I am now shifting the focus of  this paper to offer you a view of  my own motivations and experiences 
during MTB sessions. Although the following information was not always discussed during M.T.B. 
sessions, I offer it here to help you understand why I believe the development of  practical reasoning. 
can be a useful tool for support networks such as M.T.B..
While consciously observing and documenting activities in M.T.B. sessions, I have also been partici-
pating in discussions since the group’s inception and helping to contribute to the development of  the 
ethics of  care promoted within the group. Although I have been the only member of  the group with 
a stated interest in testing a particular theory rather than developing particular theatrical practices 
or works, regular group members have encouraged me to pursue my interests within the network. 
So, during the first session and some sessions thereafter, I explained my interests in ‘virtue theory’ 
along with my desire to explore how this theory relates to practices being developed by the group. I 
then continued to explore and experiment with this theory as I assumed various roles and points of  
view as a spectator, a presenter, a facilitator and member of  a community that supports the aims of  
the Magdalena project. However, while looking for ways to apply and test various elements of  virtue 
theory, I have also often found myself  exercising and developing a form of  deliberation that virtue 
theorists call ‘practical reasoning’.
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Practical reasoning is an intellectual ability that has been discussed since antiquity and philosophers 
such as Aristotle have argued that it can be developed by deliberating about what actions may be 
good for various practices. Aristotle also argued that those able to make decisions about what actions 
are good for all concerned in a practice have developed an intellectual ‘virtue’ or excellence he called 
phronësis or practical wisdom.1 Stan van Hooft’s succinct explanation of  Aristotle’s defence of  this 
virtue clearly outlines aspects of  his arguments relevant to distinctions between ‘process’ and ‘product’ 
in performance analysis:
Aristotle’s concept of  prudence (phronësis) is central to his whole ethical philosophy. To 
understand it we need to consider Aristotle’s concepts of  ‘action’ and ‘production.’ Pro-
duction is typified my making something. As such its goal is that which is made. If  I make 
a violin, then the goal of  my activity is the production of  that violin. My activity is com-
pleted, fulfilled or ‘perfected’ by the violin that is the outcome of  the production process. 
In contrast, an ‘action’, in Aristotle’s special sense of  that term is an activity for which 
the goal is the excellent doing of  the activity itself. Suppose I play the violin and suppose 
further that I do so without an audience. What, then, is the objective of  my activity? It is 
the making of  beautiful music. But what is the making of  beautiful music if  not simply the 
excellent playing of  the violin? Music is not a product (unless it is recorded or heard by an 
audience). It is gone the moment it is produced. The point of  my activity is to play well 
rather than to make anything in the way of  a definite product. So here the activity is its 
own reward, as it were. It has no goal except its own excellence in performance [. . . ]. The 
intellectual skill or virtue that is particular to action understood in this way is prudence or 
practical wisdom (phronësis). Normally (even in the ancient Greek it would seem) prudence 
is understood as the ability to make decisions that are to your own benefit. You act pru-
dently when you do something that turns out well for yourself  and for others for whom 
you might be concerned. But Aristotle builds a new level of  meaning into this sense of  the 
word. The violin player is benefiting himself, not in the way a busker who collects money 
for playing well might, but by simply playing well. The better I play the violin in my bed-
room the better I will feel about it and the more rewarding it will be for me [. . . ]. When-
ever I do something that takes some concentration, skill or commitment on my part, my 
doing it well will be a source of  a sense of  accomplishment and fulfilment for me. It will be 
a self-betterment in an ethical sense (though not it a moral sense; there is no direct question 
here of  right or wrong or of  moral enhancement or corruption). So the point of  perform-
ing actions of  this kind is to achieve this kind of  self-fulfilment (van Hooft 2006, 66-67).
As van Hooft notes, Aristotle argued that the evaluative processes and deliberations involved in the 
performance of  actions believed to be good are extremely relevant to the development of  practical 
wisdom and can be considered quite distinct from the goals and aims associated with the produc-
tion of  goods. This view has been developed and discussed by many classical, early Christian, and 
medieval scholars, artists, and philosophers and their definitions of  the virtue of  practical wisdom, 
phronësis or prudentia (the Latin version)—one of  the four ‘cardinal’ virtues identified by classical Christian 
philosophers and theologians—have been further examined and extended in different practices over 
the many centuries since then. Indeed, contemporary philosophers continue to analyse and argue 
about the particular form of  reasoning Aristotle identified with phronësis. Some believe the complex
and subtle distinctions he attributed to this ability should continue to be identified in discussions of  
practical wisdom: David Depew, for example, insists that any discussion of  practical wisdom and/
or prudence should also recognise that Aristotle introduced the idea that “phronesis” is primarily 
“a cognitive act [my emphasis]” (2004, 169). While acts can obviously produce various results and 
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orientations, Depew explains that Aristotle distinguished the cognitive act he associated with phrone-
sis in the following way:
It is supposed to be intellectual insight (and not mere opinion [. . .]) into what course of  
action should be chosen in a particular, usually vexing, situation if  the best interests of  
the self  and those who are extensions of  the self  (family, friends, fellow citizens) are to be 
preserved [. . .] [However,] It differs from sunesis, which is insight into what others should 
do; advising is not deliberating. (2004, 169).
As you can see here, Depew explains that those supporting Aristotle’s views today still argue there 
is a form of  reasoning that is not the act of  offering an opinion and it not the act of  advising but is 
something that develops in an individual via deliberation over what course of  action to choose in 
challenging and ‘vexing’ situations. While Depew distinguishes aspects of  Aristotle’s view of  phronësis 
by contrasting what it is with what it is not, he goes on to examine more details of  Aristotle’s views 
of  emotion and how they relate to the development of  this virtue. I will not outline these distinctions 
here, or introduce objections that might be made to these views. I simply wish to note that Depew 
is not alone and that many other contemporary philosophers have investigated, promoted and/or 
challenged Aristotle’s arguments about the virtue of  phronësis or practical wisdom, including Martha 
Nussbaum.
Nussbaum is perhaps the best known contemporary virtue theorist today and she is a great admirer of  
Aristotle’s work. While she regards herself  as an Aristotelian to some extent, she has also repeatedly
stated she does not agree with a number of  his views (see Nussbaum 2000a). One clear point of  depar-
ture is that she has argued that ‘practical reason’ should be viewed as a ‘capability’ that can be devel-
oped in various ways. I think her revision of  the term is really important because she has separated
value-laden abstract arguments about what makes practical wisdom ‘excellent’ (and therefore a virtue) 
and identified a particular intellectual faculty that can be engaged, exercised, or disengaged in delib-
erations about what is best to do in specific practices. In a similar way to Depew’s mode of  reasoning, 
Nussbaum also explains what practical reason is by drawing attention to what it is not:
Where practical reason is concerned, we can more easily imagine the absence of  the rel-
evant function: an adult, having learned to think about the planning of  a life, decides that 
he or she simply doesn’t want to do that any longer, and joins some authoritarian society 
(whether a religious cult or the military) that will from now on do her thinking for her. 
Now of  course such a person still functions in accordance with practical reason in small 
ways, deciding how to brush her teeth and how much to eat at the table. But most of  the 
major choices of  life are taken out of  her hands (2000b, 92).
This argument also seems designed to exercise practical reasoning since it places two ideas together 
and asks the reader to consider their relationship and practical value; i.e. think about the adult in a 
religious cult choosing not to think then consider how conscious you are of  deliberating about the 
actions and consequences of  actions you perform each day. As this view implies, Nussbaum suggests 
that deliberations about what may be best for each of  us and for others we care about involve active 
rational engagement of  the capacity she calls practical reasoning.
While Nussbaum argues that this form of  deliberation is particularly important to develop in environ-
ments that value democratic processes and social interaction, her arguments also suggest that practical 
reasoning requires people to consider whether they are willing and able to exercise this capability.2 
While she recognises that new theories, knowledge, information, or skills also offer valuable contribu-
tions to an individual’s education, she also notes that such information does not necessarily engage the
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form of  reasoning that is exercised by deliberating about what is good for specific practices. In short, 
while skills, knowledge etc can enhance practical reasoning, they cannot replace such reasoning. This 
point is probably obvious to many here but it was something that only really became apparent to me 
when I began facilitating feedback sessions in M.T.B..
As a person developing a ‘theory’ or ‘way of  seeing’, I was more inclined to assume the position of  a 
disinterested observer watching ideas and actions and then asking questions or documenting details 
according to the theoretical frame I was attempting to employ. However, being a participant and facil-
itator in sessions also required me to engage in discussions aiming to evaluate and determine the best 
ways to accommodate the interests and differences of  various people in each group. Being a facilitator 
using an ethics of  care was by far the most difficult role to assume as I had to be mindful of  allowing 
others to explore their views but also had to find ways to encourage others to explore often divergent 
values of  those that had requested feedback. In order to pursue my own interests, I also had to find 
ways to articulate and sometimes defend my own evaluative distinctions when they were challenged 
while still trying to establish a win-win situation for everyone rather than a win-lose situation based 
on most persuasive arguments. During this process, I started to discover how the theoretical frame I 
believed was useful for studying various activities could be used to develop practices. As this process 
also required me to perform the theory I was defending, I also started realising that my ability to employ 
practical reasoning was very underdeveloped!
As I had primarily observed participants during the Festival, I had supposed my role in the M.T.B. 
group would also be to consider whether the components of  reasoning identified by Nussbaum and 
others are evident during deliberations over what is good in specific practices. However, what has 
surprised me during my involvement with M.T.B. is the degree to which practical reasoning has to 
develop when one tries to discover the best way to develop one’s own interests as well as the interests 
of  others in specific communities and practices trying to develop policies and processes (rather than 
simply offering an opinion). While theoretical frames sometimes encourage individuals to take a step 
back and assume a general view of  similarities and differences within practices, discussions in M.T.B. 
sessions have illustrated how generalisations of  practices can also ignore the values and the challenges 
of  individuals in specific practices that may only become apparent via discussion. The M.T.B. sessions 
have therefore led me to realise that deliberating with others about the specific values they may or 
may not wish to use to support their practices requires the exploration of  complex values, hidden aims 
and histories specific to each practice. While I make no claims to be expert at this reasoning, I want to 
consider how to engage this form of  deliberation with you here today.
PART 3
AFTER: Inviting spectators to deliberate in this practice
The first part of  this paper outlined a view of  M.T.B. that positioned me as a disinterested observer 
studying an ‘object’; a position often adopted when trying to define ‘objective’ knowledge. The second 
section assumed a more ‘subjective’ position that detailed my own interests and experiences in M.T.B.; 
this position is sometimes recognised as a hermeneutic position that conveys information that may 
allow others to understand more about a project. In virtue theory, these two positions are identified as 
forms of  reasoning associated with the development of  knowledge and understanding; however, they 
do not necessarily engage practical reasoning. While the development of  knowledge often requires ob-
servation of  how and why others decide to act, virtue theorists like Nussbaum argue that you have to 
engage practical reasoning if  you want to make an informed decision about what is ‘good’ in a specific 
practice like this one. Various forms of  knowledge and skills can and usually are employed to support 
such reasoning, but those engaging in practical reasoning also need to consider how various elements are
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best utilised in specific circumstances and what conceptions of  the good are supported.3 I acknowl-
edge that the aim of  discovering what is good may not always be a recognisable motivation. However, 
I am hoping that at least a few people will agree to deliberate about what is good in this practice.
Before outlining the arguments we will explore, I first want to thank the panel—Ed Scheer and 
Helena Grehan in particular—for introducing me to Luc Boltanski’s work. I had not heard of  this theorist
before and was delighted to discover another continental thinker promoting further reflection upon 
the connections between practical reasoning, theatrical practices, and philosophical analysis. As 
Boltanski observes, ethics and politics are closely related fields of  study. I would argue that ethical 
systems are usually developed to help or give guidance to people wanting to live a good life (in various 
circumstances) while political systems are usually developed in order to enable people in a society to 
live a good life and develop their full potential (in various ways and ratios). However, in his text Distant 
Suffering Boltanski offers a very detailed analysis of  the differences between deliberations about dif-
ferent ethical actions and beliefs developed and supported in small collectives and communities, and 
deliberations in the domain of  the public sphere. In the latter domain, he notes that political systems 
are developed and maintained according to an “ideal of  an aperspectival objectivity [like the one I 
adopted in section one] which favours the publicity of  matters of  debate” (1999, 32).
Boltanski is arguing that representations of  suffering and debates about suffering of  others in the 
public sphere have increasingly positioned onlookers as passive spectators rather than participants 
in a large community. Rather than accepting such passivity, Boltanski is exploring and advocating a 
range of  responses available to spectators who wish to resist such construction and enact change. As 
Peter Wagner notes,
[. . .] such responses include the observation of  situated actions, where situations are 
always in need of  interpretation [. . .] the analysis of  the registers of  justification and eval-
uation which are mobilized in the situation but transcends it, and the study of  the elabora-
tion of  devices both material and cognitive, that are meant to stabilize situations and can 
potentially create widely extended and relatively durable social phenomena (1999, 346).
Ilana Friedrich Silber also notes that Boltanski’s project is part of  a field that emerged in the 1990s 
called “pragmatic sociology” and she explains that this field of  analysis,
[. . .] quickly focused its attention on one, very specific category of  ‘practical reasoning’, 
namely, the range of  arguments and principles of  evaluation which individuals deploy 
in the process of  trying to define what may be the most proper or legitimate action or 
standard of  action, and whereby they grope for or re-establish social agreement. Intrinsic 
to such ‘regimes of  justification’ [. . .] is the tendency to articulate principles of  a broad, 
generalizing nature, of  the kind apt to carry across and beyond shifting concrete situations 
and contexts (2003, 429).
These interests are clearly related to my own investigations of  practical reasoning and support 
Nussbaum’s advocacy for the development of  practical reasoning. As I have only read one text by 
Boltanski, I make no claim to being expert and suggest you raise any questions about the details of  
these views with Ed. However, I do know something of  Nussbaum’s views of  activities in the public 
sphere and can say they appear to be very similar to Boltanski’s in many ways. Nevertheless, she has 
also continued to promote the development of  a political objectivity within liberal democracies and 
makes the following point:
[t]he account of  political objectivity begins from a simple insight. It is that if  we are to live
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with others politically on terms of  mutual respect and seek reasonable terms of  coopera 
tion with them, we must be able to distinguish between simply putting forward our own
opinion and recommending principles that are reasonable for all. We must believe that 
the principles that undergird our political order are the result of  a reasoned search for a 
reasonable basis of  a mutually respectful political life, and that, in their status and their 
content, they express respect for the reason of  all citizens (2001, 894-5).
In order to do this she also argues that we need to establish the following five elements that will enable 
a necessary and sufficient conception of  political objectivity:
a public framework of  judgment, an account of  correctness in judgment, a ranking or 
ordering of  reasons, a distinction between the merely local or personal and the politi-
cally objective, and, finally, an account of  reasoning toward agreement [. . . ]. These five 
elements in place, we are able to distinguish mistaken from correct political claims; to 
distinguish sincere but misguided recommendations from genuinely reasonable recom-
mendations, and so forth. Without these elements [. . .] we have trouble distinguishing 
one person’s sincerely held conviction from what may be reasonably recommended as a 
norm for all citizens. But any liberal political order must be able to make such a distinc-
tion, holding that its principles concerning basic rights and liberties are not merely this or 
that person’s doctrine, but are reasonable principles to regulate public life for all, in the 
light of  the recognition of  a reasonable plurality of  comprehensive doctrines (Nussbaum 
2001, 895-6).
While I raise these ideas for your consideration, I am certainly NOT offering any conclusions about 
such matters in this paper. However, I would now like to hand back the floor to our chair and invite all 
spectators here in this session to exercise their practical reasoning by deliberating over the following
questions:
Do you think it is ‘good’ for performers or performance scholars to consider the political 
and ethical aims outlined above?
Is there such a thing as a ‘good’ aesthetic judgement and how might artists and scholars 
evaluate and justify such judgements?
________________________
Notes
1. These arguments are evident in a number of  texts but primarily explored through his ethical treatise, 
Nichomachean Ethics. See online reference below.
2. For example, she recognises that totalitarian regimes may not encourage the development of  this capability 
and that a decision not to deliberate over what is best may be a wise strategy in some cases.
3. I also believe this form of  reasoning is engaged in various plays that seem to invite audiences to 
compare events and conditions on stage with events and conditions offstage (e.g,. Shakespeare, Ibsen, 
Mayakovsky, Brecht).
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Appendix: About the M.T.B. network
1) Who has been involved in sessions?
All contributions to M.T.B. sessions have been voluntary and the group has remained open to par-
ticipants who were not involved in the Magdalena Australia Festival. However, all participants have 
been informed that the group is organized by artists from the Festival who support similar aims to 
those outlined in the international Magdalena Project [see aims listed above]. Some of  the theatre 
practitioners, scholars, and companies who have been involved in sessions to date include the found-
ers, Scotia, Dawn and Julie as well as Sue Rider, Donna Cameron, Anna Yen, Leah Mercer, Katrina 
Devry, Flloyd Kennedy, Kathryn Kelly, Caroline Heim, Stace Callaghan, and some core members 
of  the Queensland Shakespeare Ensemble. Additional artists and students have also been invited to 
support various works in progress, such as rehearsed readings of  Donna Cameron’s play Voltaire’s 
Seed (subsequently changed to Rousseau’s Seed after feedback)
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2) Where have sessions been located?
M.T.B. meetings are usually held at easily accessible central locations in Brisbane’s Fortitude Valley 
as some participants have to travel from far-flung areas in Brisbane as well as the North and South 
Coasts (for example, the playwright Donna Cameron has ferried over from her home on an island in 
Moreton Bay). More formal meetings with facilitators or presenters have been convened in
offices or spaces provided for free by organizations such as Playlab, the Judith Wright Performing 
Arts Centre, and the University of  Queensland while less formally structured discussion sessions 
have been convened in centrally located cafes. M.T.B. also has some presence on the net via links 
to the Magdalena Project and an e-group that Scotia Monkovitch maintains; Monkivitch regularly 
circulates notices and reminders of  upcoming sessions.
3) When have sessions occurred?
For two years after the Magdalena Australia Festival, sessions were very regular events held once a 
month on Monday nights. However, these meetings have been less regularly scheduled over the last 
year and a half.
4) How many attend the sessions?
Numbers at sessions have always been small and attendance has ranged from between 3-15 
participants per meeting. While numbers have always fluctuated in accordance with people’s 
availability or interest in topics being explored, the network has also constantly struggled to secure 
and/or maintain members’ commitment to attend sessions. There was also been a distinct lack 
of  participation in sessions offered this year. In late 2007, sessions have been relaunched by Scotia 
Monkivitch and have had a range of  women aged 19-60 attending. The last session in September 
2007 had about 15 participants, and plans are being made to secure funding for another local event 
to showcase and develop women’s work early 2008.
5) Why the fluctuating interest and/or decline in attendance numbers?
I can only really speculate here. The fluctuating numbers supporting M.T.B. sessions have been an 
ongoing problem for M.T.B. since its inception. Some meetings have been dedicated to developing 
strategies to attract further interest or improve attendance over the years since the Festival but the 
strategies have not produced much difference. Sometimes attendance has increased when theatre-
makers with recognized levels of  influence and industry experience have agreed to participate or 
run a session [eg. Sue Rider or Anna Yen]. The slightly higher numbers in attendance at these 
sessions therefore may suggest that members want to access a network of  people that have proved 
they can enhance work or opportunities to get work or that they may be less interested in discussing 
ideas, interests, or work with people they believe are unlikely or unable to enhance or develop their 
work.. However, these views are, as I say, purely speculative and founded only on my interpretation 
of  slight increases in numbers and relevant responses in the group as I have not surveyed less regular 
members or checked their reasons for attending meetings
One point I can note with certainty is that the network has been maintained primarily through the 
joint efforts of  Scotia, Julie and Dawn. Since Julie and Dawn moved away from Brisbane last year, 
Scotia has been trying to maintain the group without any extra support or time. As a result, she has, 
very understandably, decided to stop convening regular sessions at this point but still maintains con-
tact with people from the network through email when possible, resulting in the recommencement 
of  sessions as of  August 2007.
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Postscript
The Magdalena Talks Back Network was reformulated as the Magdalena Brisbane network in 2008. 
This network organized a Magdalena Gathering over Easter 08 for local artists and scholars and 
with internet links between artists in Magdalena networks in Perth, Australia and Wellington, New 
Zealand. For further information, click on link to documentation of  this event at: 
http://magdalenagathering.blogspot.com/
Gillian Kehoul teaches Drama in the School of  English, Media Studies and Art History. Her 
research explores the relevance of  Virtue Theory for the study and practice of  theatrical 
performances in classical and contemporary contexts.
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